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Revisiting Morale under the Bombs:  
The Gender of Affect in Darmstadt, 1942-1945 
 
 
Intensified Allied bombing brought World War II into the homes of the German civilian 
population in the spring of 1942. Aerial attack alerts and bombing raids shaped life in larger 
German cities such as Hamburg, Köln, Essen, Berlin, Frankfurt, and Dresden, and redefined the 
term “home front”. Bringing destruction, displacement and death, the war heavily affected urban 
populations in their physical and mental wellbeing for more than three years. Yet, somehow, 
everyday life continued. Fritz Limmer (1881 – 1947), a retired chemistry professor who spent the 
air war in the Hessian town of Darmstadt, recorded his experience in a diary. During the summer 
of 1944 Limmer observed with growing concern the effect war had on the members of his family: 
“Grete and Helgard [his wife and daughter] absolutely have to run to the movies after lunch. 
(Reverie). I am astonished by Grete’s behavior, as she knows nothing about her siblings’ fate in 
Romania. It defies comprehension. And all the talk about ‘finding relaxation’ doesn’t impress me 
either.” He feared for his family’s cohesion: “And thus the disintegration between us invariably 
continues, precisely now when we can somewhat endure this time only with harmony. It will 
become even more difficult than it already is (…) .”1  
Limmer’s pessimistic observations tempt us to explore a society decisively shaped by war 
and the corroding effects conflict had on the individual. In the male defined sphere of military 
conflict, the aspect of gendered experience invites particular attention.2 With a whole generation 
of men gone to the battlefields of Europe and North Africa, involved in the administration and 
plundering of conquered territory, or participating in Germany’s genocidal machinery (though 
joined in the concentration camps by a growing number of female SS auxiliaries), the exigencies 
of war on the home front had a lasting effect on gender relations in German society and 
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profoundly affected the idealized role conceptions of womanhood and manhood in Nazi society.3 
To a certain extent, this was a re-occurrence of processes observable in Germany during World 
War I, when “total mobilization destroyed the divisions between the military and civil society 
and between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ spheres, only to replace them with the separation 
between the male combat zone of the battlefield and the female noncombat zone of producing 
and reproducing the means of destruction” as women replaced the absent men in the war 
economy.4 
A new feature of WWII was the physical proximity of a growing number of women to 
death and destruction. Inspired by Michael Geyer’s 1995 suggestion that the history of war 
should be written as “a history of organized deadly force”, Karen Hagemann concluded that “the 
dimension of violence, which was generally exercised and suffered in gender-specific ways, 
should also be a central focus of a social and gender history of the (…) war.”5 This article 
explores how the experience of “deadly force”, as well as the gender and age-related preparation 
and knowledge with which individuals encountered war violence and made sense of it, shaped 
social re-organization during the final months of the war. It shows how, in WWII Germany, 
female roles in relation to the state – regardless of whether women mended clothes, produced 
ammunition, or actively helped in combat to defend the home front – underwent a redefinition, 
ideologically recasting all these activities as patriotic duty to the Fatherland. Nazi propaganda 
sought to prevent a reoccurrence of the 1918 home front breakdown, which had contributed to 
Germany’s willingness to end the war, and in which women had played an important role.6 It 
utilized the stab-in-the-back myth, according to which the World War I armistice and peace 
treaty represented a betrayal of military efforts by the people and politics on the home front. Nazi 
propaganda used the myth to gain an electoral following in the Weimar Republic and then 
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employed it to mobilize Germany for war, exploiting feelings of the nation’s humiliation, unfair 
treatment at Versailles and a promise of renewed greatness.7 Ingrained in collective memory and 
political entrenchment, it remained an influential lesson for the Party and wartime society alike. 
This study complicates the dualism of male battlefront and female home front further 
through an examination of the gendered experience of bombing in Darmstadt, a small town near 
Frankfurt on Main. It is based on a previously unexamined source base of home front narratives 
from 1945, transcribed interviews with men and women from different social and generational 
backgrounds who had recently lived through the bombing experience. As strategic bombing was 
a new feature of air warfare, the United States military had a vested interest in learning about its 
outcomes and efficiency. As soon as they entered Germany, American occupying forces began 
extracting strategic and military lessons from captured administrative records and from 
interviews with German officials, industrialists, workers, and civilians. This effort led to the 
publication of a series of 208 studies about bombing in Europe (and Japan) during World War II 
that became known as the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (USSBS). Historians 
interested in air warfare over Nazi Germany have used the USSBS reports on German morale 
extensively. Shaped by the surveys’ initial purpose, these historians’ narratives have featured 
Allied air strategy, thus literally writing history from above. By and large, these historical works 
focus on the course and material effects of the air raids;8 yet others turn their attention to the 
home front experience, and the immediate chaos and suffering resulting from the raids.9 
While the USSBS reports are popular among historians of the German home front, the 
original interviews have been practically ignored as a source of wartime experience. Over 170 
interview transcripts from Darmstadt have survived and are housed in the US National Archives 
in College Park, Maryland. The USSBS morale division group began the interview series in 
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Darmstadt on April 4, 1945, more than a month before the war in Europe officially ended with 
German surrender. For each interviewee the face sheet provides information on sex, age, and 
marital status, number of children, education, and occupation during the war as well as 
membership in NASDAP organizations, personal material situation, and deaths in the family. 
Accordingly, this allows for an analysis by social strata, gender, and age cohort.  
Using interviews as historical sources raises familiar questions about the reliability and 
veracity of memories. Moreover, this set of interviews emerged from a specific context. They 
were recorded at a transformative moment, in the late spring of 1945, when Germans collectively 
and individually tried to make sense of defeat in a war that was meant to achieve Germany’s 
world domination. The context is thus very different from the longue durée perspective that Jörg 
Arnold offers in his comparative study of collective urban war memory in East and West 
German towns.10 Nevertheless, placing the individual in relation to a nascent collective memory 
can be useful as well in understanding these more immediate testimonies in regards to agency, 
subjectivity and the self.11 At the same time it is important to contextualize the interviews, and to 
be mindful of the power relations at play between the interviewers and their subjects.  
The fact that the American occupiers conducted these interviews might leave the reader 
wondering about the respondents’ authenticity as well as interviewers’ biases. German civilians 
may not have been willing to reveal the whole extent of their defeat to the former enemy or they 
might have concealed their politics in order to avoid blame and punishment for the crimes of the 
Third Reich. The USSBS unit outfitted interviewers, often native German speakers, with a 
detailed list of 43 questions that measured 1) emotional change; 2) changes in political attitudes; 
and 3) in behavior of the respondents; as well as 4) measures of certain experiences and beliefs 
assumed to correlate with the moral effects produced by bombing. Specific information 
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objectives accompanied the questions, instructing the interviewers to probe for elaborate 
answers.12 Thus, a narrative arch and a strong element of guidance were built into the interview 
structure. Granted, interviewers strived foremost to create an atmosphere of trust by building 
good rapport and using the guarantee of full anonymity. This was meant to put the interviewee at 
ease, to overcome respondents’ initial “you Americans” versus “us Germans” attitude. 
Interviewers rated both rapport and the respondents’ perceived truthfulness on the face sheet, and 
noted any suspicions. 
It seems that the peaceful course of the American occupation provided Darmstadters with 
growing trust in the new ruling authority, especially those who had suffered under Nazi 
surveillance. Responding to a question about how he was faring under the occupation, a former 
soldier and camp inmate sounded relieved: “Things are now going good. I am now free and can 
speak freely. Before I lived always in fear, could not speak freely because of the Gestapo.”13 
Although the analytical challenges around omissions and “memory grooming” remain, the 
interviews offer an exciting opportunity for a close reading of wartime experience. While the 
interview transcripts are not traditional forms of life writing, they nevertheless allow us to 
discover complex social actors. They document one moment in the ongoing narrative process of 
an individual “with a real history and psychology” constructing him- or herself in the specific 
context of WWII Nazi society and defeat.14 As Maynes and others have argued, “human agency 
and individual social action is best understood in connection with the construction of selfhood in 
and through historically specific social relationships and institutions.”15 We can thus approach 
the home front with a differentiated perspective; using narrative analytical approaches based on 
post-structuralist concepts of language as representative and constitutive of subjectivity, while 
simultaneously historicizing gender difference in lived experience.16 
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Bombing offers a relatively “gender-neutral” wartime event as historical context for 
gender analysis. In this way this study is careful not to recreate the archetypal division between 
male perpetrators and female victims that has been the subject of passionate discussion in 
German women’s history over the last three decades, and which has centered on topics such as 
rape, expulsion or other war events that have been seen as predominately female ordeals.17 Air 
raids, instead, have been at the center of a hard fought historical debate about general German 
victimhood in World War II. The most contentious point was whether acknowledging German 
suffering would relativize Third Reich war crimes, especially the Holocaust.18 In the light of 
these debates, this study by no means wishes to measure or compare suffering, but rather seeks to 
explore human rational and affective capabilities for endurance and resilience in a state of 
emergency. 
Allied strategic bombing aimed to destroy both the war economy and the 
Volksgemeinschaft, together with the public solidarity and loyalty to the Nazi regime that the 
concept implied. Morale became a prime target at the height of the war in 1942, chosen with the 
hope that if military success on the battlefield remained unattainable, American and British 
bombing and demoralization efforts could defeat Nazi Germany from within. The Allies believed 
that, if it were put under sufficient material and social pressure, the German population would 
eventually lose faith in its leadership and the home front would collapse, emulating the situation 
of 1918 and leading to a quicker end to the war. In fact, by targeting the German war industry 
and its workers, bombing effectively caused an uneven share of hardships between urban and 
rural areas. This reinvigorated long-standing societal tensions between working class and middle 
class, spatially represented by urban centers and the countryside.19 By the time World War II 
ended for Germany on May 8, 1945, the consequences of Allied bombing had resulted in 
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305,000 fatalities, 780,000 wounded, and 1,865,000 homes destroyed. 20  Close to 5 million 
people were evacuated and 20 million were deprived of utilities. Altogether, more than a third of 
the population had been physically affected. Yet even during the heaviest bombings in 1944/45 
there was neither widespread organized dissent against the Nazi regime, nor strike action in the 
war industries. Sociologists agree that the results of the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys 
indicate that the bombing failed to incite major panics or sustained chaos.21 And even the US 
military analysts admitted in 1945 that strategic bombing was not as successful as expected in 
undermining German morale or loyalty to the Nazi regime.22 More recently, Nicholas Stargardt 
has suggested that, “far from leading to collapse, successive crises acted as catalysts of radical 
transformation (…). Major disasters like Stalingrad and Hamburg did indeed lead to a 
catastrophic fall in the regime’s popularity, but they did not themselves call patriotic 
commitment into question.”23 The war, he argues, though unpopular, remained legitimate. 
Stargardt is the latest voice in a literature that has revised the heretofore common view 
that dissolution of the – illusory – monolithic Volksgemeinschaft equaled the collapse of morale. 
Earlier research has pointed to the fact that atomization of the home front and solidarity existed 
alongside each other as “individuals and groups were increasingly thrown upon their own 
resources—as multiple and competing communities of fate—amid the escalating chaos in 
Germany.”24 And Christian Goeschel found that it was not a lack of social integration, but rather 
the specter of defeat, ideological fanaticism or fear of the advancing enemy armies that caused a 
dip in morale followed by a wave of suicides in the spring of 1945.25  
What becomes evident is that we need a more complex understanding of German wartime 
morale, one that goes beyond Volksgemeinschaft and similar, objectifying terminology. Morale 
has a collective emotional life, it is a relational concept that becomes traceable in the individual’s 
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interaction with culturally specific social dynamics or power techniques, such as the stab-in-the-
back myth that the Nazis continued to employ in their mobilization propaganda – a collective 
memory of national shame and betrayal in 1918 that could only be overcome if all Germans 
fulfilled their patriotic duty. Morale, then, is not a delimited object that can “break or be lost”, it 
is a “commonplace, a dimension of all activities”, as Ben Anderson proposes. 26 Morale is thus 
defined by its in-betweenness, comported with what affect scholar Brian Massumi has described 
as the individual’s capacity for simultaneously affecting and being affected in an ongoing 
process of change.27 This suggests that the affect of morale can be traced, too, in the ways in 
which people adopt or react against specific, yet changing gender structures in the Third Reich, 
whether they did so knowingly or not. The question I want to ask here is: how did morale relate 
to the gendered self?  
A town of moderate size, Darmstadt in the Gau of Hesse-Nassau, is a suitable location for 
a case study to engage with subtleties of communal cohesion and gender relations in situations of 
emergency. Surrounded by densely forested rolling hills, secluded Darmstadt is situated in the 
Rhine-Main area about 30 kilometers from Frankfurt. Only half an hour away by train from the 
rural, agriculturally rich Odenwald region, Darmstadt, the former administrative center of the 
grand duchy Hesse, was a Beamtenstadt (town of civil servants) with small industry and large 
residential areas in the 1930s. The town was popular with tourists for its cultural riches and 
historic buildings including the narrow, but charming late medieval center of the city. On March 
5, 1933, 50 percent of the participating voters in Darmstadt cast their ballot for the NSDAP, all 
in all 30,932 votes, thereby exceeding results above the Reich’s average of 43.9 percent. These 
elections saw a record voter turnout of 89 percent, not surprising as this is considered to be the 
first undemocratic election of the Third Reich.28 Yet Darmstadt had become a stronghold of the 
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Nazi party already during the Great Depression, providing above Reich average results in 
Reichstag elections from 1930 onwards.29 Darmstadt’s population, numbering approximately 
110,000 in 1939, remained relatively steady over the course of the war until it dropped abruptly 
after large area bombings by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in September 1944.30 The local food 
administration reported the lowest population count for January of 1945 with 50,487, signifying 
an overall population decline of 54 percent. People returned with accelerated frequency only 
after the town surrendered to the American army on March 25, 1945, pushing the number up to 
54,274 in June 1945.31  
This study attempts to bring these numbers to life, and to illuminate gendered aspects of 
extra-ordinary, yet almost daily, hardships in Darmstadt during the final year of World War II. 
Because of the simultaneous occurrence of the Holocaust, the Jewish experience of the bombings 
as well as that of ethnic minorities in Darmstadt is difficult to reconstruct. Under escalating anti-
Semitism and racial policy, anyone who had the means and the foresight emigrated to the United 
States or to South America before the British began strategic bombing in 1942, as quarterly 
reports of the Jewish Mutual Assistance Society and monthly residential reports of the Darmstadt 
Jewish congregation show. The remaining 1,378 Jews in the region were sent to a crueler destiny 
in four deportation transports in 1942 and 1943 that departed eastwards from the Rhineland to 
the transfer ghettos Theresienstadt and Piaski-Lublin, from where many went on to perish in the 
eastern extermination camps.32 By the spring of 1943, Darmstadt was stripped of its Jewish 
population, and thus their stories were not recorded in the USSBS interviews.33 During the same 
period, several million people from Poland, the Protectorate, and the Ukraine were forcibly 
shipped to the Reich to work in the war industries and agriculture. More than two thousand 
arrived in Darmstadt in the spring of 1942 and their number rose to 6,560 in May 1944, of which 
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about two thirds were men. Yet this number never exceeded 12 percent of the overall 
workforce.34 Minorities falling outside of the racialized Volksgemeinschaft were for the most part 
excluded from communal air raid protection.35 Foreign workers had an air defense status similar 
to that of Jews who were married to German citizens. Usually, they were not allowed to look for 
shelter in communal cellars and were left to fend for themselves. The air war over Germany 
caused a high death toll among foreign workers also because they were often housed in the 
vicinity of targeted industry.  
Aware of such limitations, this study traces the experience of bombing among the racially 
defined Volksgemeinschaft. The first part examines the spatial specificity of Darmstadt as an 
unlikely air raid target, and explores how this circumstance influenced the population’s 
psychological and emotional preparation for the air raids. This is followed by an analysis of the 
war’s implications for personal life, the matters that relate to affective collectivity, relationships, 
and emotional as well as physical health. Ultimately, this study explores the affective dialogue 
between the personal sphere of survival and the public sphere of warfare, and examines how 
these changed in relation to increasingly fluid gender roles in a besieged Third Reich. 
Interestingly, the bombing put patriarchal society under pressure and set the stage for a period of 
female self-sufficiency during the second half of the war from as early as 1942, thus predating 
the widespread attribution of female agency to the “hour of the woman” during the final days of 
the war and Allied occupation in post-war Germany.36  
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Preparing for the Worst: Air Raid Protection 
 Until 1942, the German home front remained relatively untouched by the havoc of war.  
Great Britain flew minor bombing missions against industrial targets in the Ruhr beginning in the 
spring of 1940, but, technologically as well as strategically, bombing as a means of warfare was 
still in its infancy.37 After having used aerial bombing in the Spanish Civil War and the invasion 
of Poland, Hitler also experimented with the bombing of British cities, including London, in 
aerial attacks in the fall of 1940. This campaign became known as the Blitz, the first intentional 
large-scale bombardment of civilian areas that killed more than twenty thousand people.38 Later 
in the war, the German Luftwaffe also bombed Russian cities such as Moscow and Leningrad on 
the eastern front. Despite the bombings, the war in the west against the British did not proceed as 
quickly as the offensive against France had that summer — the planned invasion of Britain 
(Operation Sea Lion) was never carried through — and Germany began preparations for the 
eventuality of extended air war with Britain in the fall of 1940. 
Officials ranked the town of Darmstadt low in terms of air raid endangerment because of 
its military insignificance and small-scale war industry.39 The only decisive industrial sites were 
Merck’s chemical plant, a renowned producer of pharmaceutical drugs, and the machinery 
constructor Röhm und Haas, which were both located at the industrial outskirts in the northern 
part of town. Together, they produced over 50 per cent of the city’s industrial production and 
employed 42.6 per cent of local industrial workers.40 Darmstadt’s overall industrial significance 
was negligible, less than 0.2 percent of the German total production. 41  The Gau rather 
concentrated its protection and defense efforts in industrially and strategically important cities 
such as nearby Frankfurt on Main, which was later indeed heavily bombed.42 
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In contrast to the rational calculations of the mobilization agency, Darmstadters 
developed a variety of assertions as to why their city would be spared from the bombs. Some 
thought that the Allies would not be able to find Darmstadt because of its secluded location in 
the forests. Others believed Britain would not dare to attack the residence of the grand duke of 
Hesse-Darmstadt’s English wife, Princess Margaret of Hesse and Rhine, whose friendly ties to 
the British Crown were well known. Even more curiously, the Merck factory presented for many 
an inhibition to Allied bombing because of its international reputation as a producer of rare 
medications.43 Explaining away the danger was an important psychological coping mechanism 
for a population under the threat of air raids. To them, it was a way to maintain normalcy and to 
perform their quotidian tasks in a war that was unavoidably moving closer to their homes. 
When they finally occurred, the attacks caught Darmstadters mentally ill-prepared. What 
Darmstadt’s citizens could not know was that their beautiful city would become the testing 
ground for a new marking and bombing strategy of RAF Bomber Command. For this maneuver, 
as military historian Max Hastings claims, Darmstadt was chosen at random: “In September 
1944, 5 Group [an RAF bomber fleet] were seeking previously undamaged area targets of 
manageable size upon which to test the accuracy and effectiveness of various marking and 
bombing techniques at tolerable cost – in other words at limited penetration inside Germany.”44 
So far spared from heavy raids, Darmstadt fitted that description perfectly. The Kavallerie 
Exerzierplatz was chosen as the marking-point because of its white soil, which was visible even 
by night. From here, the bombers would fly along seven aiming-lines covering an area roughly 
shaped like a fan, later called “Todesfächer”.45 
But even without their stoic optimism, Darmstadters had little to go on in terms of 
preparation for such an enormous attack. True, administrative orders from Frankfurt raised 
 13 
awareness of aerial defense in the whole Gau of Hesse-Nassau and issued guidelines for the case 
of air raids to surrounding police departments as well as NSDAP regional leaderships. In most of 
these air defense decrees, the population’s self-protection (Selbstschutz) occupied center-stage. 
To a large extent the protection measures depended on public cooperation. In general, air raid 
protection designated housing communities (Hausgemeinschaften), consisting either of 
apartment building tenants or the persons who lived in the same neighborhood, as the smallest 
unit in fire fighting, first aid service, and repairs.46 Concerned about the negative effect of visible 
destruction on public support for the war, the authorities emphasized the central role of the 
cooperative housing community to clear away the rubble as soon as possible, of course aided by 
mass organizations such as the Hitler Youth. Towards the end of the war, increasingly foreign 
workers, concentration-camp prisoners, and POWs were assigned to the task.47 
Understandably, the population of Darmstadt was dissatisfied with the local air raid 
protection: “These air raid precautions were nonsense. The water basins that they built were 
useless, what they should have done was to built [sic] shelters and bunkers rather than to have us 
sit in these cellars,” an interviewee grumbled.48 Aerial defense officials regarded proper bunkers 
as unnecessary for a city with low-level endangerment. The public shelters within the city limits 
held only roughly 20,000 people, which left the vast majority of the inhabitants to their own 
devices.49 Most of the population stayed in their houses’ re-enforced cellars, so-called self-
protection shelters (Selbstschutzräume), that supplied reasonable protection in the first year of 
the air war, but would become tragic death traps during the fire blaze of September 1944. In the 
apartment buildings of the inner city the Hausgemeinschaft was responsible for the re-
enforcement of the cellars and passageways to those of neighboring houses—a provision that 
would later save many lives.50  
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A cohesive air raid alarm system was introduced as early as November 1940. Possibly 
these steps were taken in the expectation of retaliation for the Luftwaffe’s bombings of British 
cities.51 Ten minutes were considered sufficient time for urban populations to retreat into shelters 
and bunkers without disrupting their normal life more than necessary. German radar was able to 
detect enemy planes long before they reached German territory, which would have allowed for 
earlier warnings, were it not for the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) terror strategy.52 British pilots 
chose detours on their way to Germany with the goal of leaving the Germans in the dark about 
the target. At the height of the air war, this led to a “war of nerves” especially in western 
Germany, because the alarms sounded in all cities as soon as allied planes approached the Reich 
border close to the industrial centers along the rivers Rhine and Ruhr. By the time Darmstadt 
surrendered to American forces on March 25, the town’s population experienced more than 700 
aerial warnings (Luftwarnungen) and alarms but merely seventeen attacks.53  
The communal aspect of survival measures fueled the denunciation culture that the Nazis 
had fostered since the seizure of power in 1933. Black-out violations were an easy way to turn in 
disagreeable neighbors to the Darmstadt Gestapo. In addition to proper oversights, such as 
accidentally switching on lights in rooms without the mandatory window black-out covers, some 
perplexing complaints were brought to the attention of the authorities. For instance, in February 
1943 a woman came forward who denounced her neighbor for leaving white laundry out to dry 
in the garden, allegedly revealing Darmstadt’s location to enemy bombers at night.54 Both men 
and women contributed to the denunciation culture, yet conflict resolution was gendered, as 
female disobedience to authority usually attracted more scrutiny. During a light attack in April 
1943, neighborly animosities played out in the self-protection shelter of Eschollbrückerstrasse 44. 
A man and a woman refused the orders of both the block and aerial defense wardens to 
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extinguish the flames. The man’s refusal to do his duty, on the grounds of him claiming to suffer 
a bad stomach ache, resulted in him becoming embroiled in a shouting match with the wardens. 
His resistance to the ensuing official charge of “air defense refusal” on health grounds was 
eventually accepted by the police. The woman, a trained fire brigade auxiliary, refused to join the 
fire fighters because of her motherly responsibility to her two children while her husband served 
in the war. She loudly challenged the wardens’ authority by pointing out their inability to bring 
order into the habitually overcrowded community shelter. An unsupervised woman, speaking up 
publically, attracted special scrutiny. In an official complaint, the air defense warden showed no 
compassion for her situation.55  The resolute women in turn showed no remorse, but rather 
implied a gendered bias and misogyny on part of the wardens in what she felt was unfair 
treatment. During her police questioning, she mentioned that the block warden had once beaten 
his wife nearly senseless in front of everybody.56 In fact, she juxtaposed her failure to do her 
duty with the wardens’ failure to do theirs. At the same time, she maintained that her principal 
responsibility was to look after her children, not to safeguard the housing community from 
expanding fires. Family unity became an increasingly political topic that informed women’s 
agency at the home front and their wartime relationship with the regime. 57  Challenges to 
changing gender norms, but also neighborly quarrels, were fought out in the field of self-
protection matters and evacuation policies. 
How women experienced the war was dependent on their individual situation. 
Nevertheless, some trends can be observed that relate to age cohort, employment, or marital 
status.58 Nazi reproduction policies shaped the female experience of the early war years most 
explicitly. Racial purity and hereditary health made matrimony desirable and marital status was 
an important marker for women in Nazi Germany.59  Yet in the later years of the war, an 
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increasing number of married women was conscripted to the war economy. While women with 
children could decide to remain in or depart from the workforce depending on their financial 
situation, childless or working-class married women did not enjoy the freedom to make this 
decision.60 In the spring of 1943, the female German work population in Darmstadt exceeded the 
number of male German workers for the first time and reached its peak in August 1943 with 
24,985 women in the workforce.61 Meanwhile, a cohort of young, unmarried women came into 
closer contact with the war effort during their Year of Duty, while experiencing a high degree of 
independence from their family, for instance for the Reich Labor Service for Female Youth 
(RADwJ) or the Auxiliary War Service (Kriegshilfsdienst). In general, working women were 
singled out as the weakest link in everyday life under the bombs; their unsupervised presence in 
working environments that they shared with foreign workers gave rise to suspicion and concerns 
about moral degeneration.  
In July 1943, Germany’s military leadership announced that women were to join the fire 
brigades because previously available men were called up to serve in the military.62  Although 
accompanied by trained fire fighters, these women entered danger just like everybody else in the 
brigade. A year later, about 50,000 women between the ages of 17 and 40 had “volunteered” for 
this service.63 The same year, women joined the anti-aircraft forces. The press portrayed their 
work as posing a challenge to femininity because “natural inclination and tendency often stand in 
the way of matters which present no difficulties to men.” At the same time, the press glorified 
female auxiliary service as a duty to the fatherland: “In return, however, these women wear the 
soldier’s garb of honor.”64 Down-playing the military nature of this war assignment while at the 
same time accommodating contemporary ideas about gender, the article resumed using 
emotional rhetoric: “Continuous training and further knowledge of the instruments soon teaches 
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the AA Auxiliaries to love and look after their searchlights as only women can.”65 It needs to be 
pointed out that in terms of survival, this post at the searchlights was more dangerous than, say, 
handling an anti-aircraft gun. The searchlights were highly visible even up to several thousand 
feet and — as an instant threat to approaching Allied bomber planes — they were often the first 
target for the vanguard Mosquito planes.  
Women thus performed male jobs not only within the war industry but also in military 
defense of their country. This was an unprecedented level of female involvement in the war 
effort, and was pronouncedly different from WWI in terms of its social acceptance.66 As a 
consequence, the experience of duty and danger contributed to increased female independence in 
German patriarchal society that played out in family relations well before Germany’s defeat and 
Allied occupation.67 However, experience of public involvement outside of the home community 
was mostly limited to single women and adolescent girls.  
Many mothers, and especially middle class women often avoided conscription into the 
war economy or the auxiliary services, yet became involved in the NSV or the 
Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft (National Socialist Women’s Organization, NSF) where 
their duties mostly did not reach beyond the city limits.68  In Nazi Germany, the power of 
decision-making regarding the upbringing and education of children was legally ascribed to the 
father, but the realities of the war transferred this responsibility to women. In the absence of their 
husbands, these women not only raised and protected the children alone or with the help of older 
family members, but also were responsible for choices such as evacuating or staying in 
Darmstadt.69 Mothers thus took on the roles of fathers as well, while support from grandparents 
was diminished by war deprivations. Due to exposure to raid nights and the stress of the daily 
alarms, the health of many elderly people was poor. Instead of alleviating the responsibility 
 18 
placed on young mothers, the generation over fifty years of age quickly became an additional 
burden and strained financial resources. A 25-year-old widow with little education, mother of a 
boy aged 8, said: “I got a family ‘Unterhalt’ of 140 RM when my husband was killed. That’s 
what I lived on since. Also mother has money saved. Mother became very sick after Sept. [the 
attack of September 1944] and was in bed more than out of bed. I only helped out here and there. 
I had to stay home with my mother.”70 After the raids, young women were the quickest to adapt 
to the changed circumstances. They organized housing and clothing for the entire family, older 
males included. This constituted an important shift in the generational and patriarchal structure 
of the German family. 
Daily raid alerts also made it difficult for women to perform their household chores. 
Asked what had been the worst thing that the raids brought with them, a mother (34) of two boys, 
who were five and ten years old at the time, complained: “I could not take care of my household 
the way I used to.”71 Alarms interrupted shopping for groceries or the preparation of food. The 
air war prevented housewives from fulfilling the gendered expectations placed on them by 
German society under Nazism,72 adding more pressure to the observational scrutiny under which 
women whose husbands were absent stood. It was not fear for her life, but rather the experience 
of unfinished housewifely duties on a daily basis that undermined the woman’s resilience, as she 
tried to maintain her sense of self in relation to her patriotic commitment.  
Exhaustion and lack of sleep were the most common effects that the alerts and bombings 
had on popular health. Shortages, especially in vitamin-rich foods or soap, and declining quality 
of meals led to weight loss over the years and deterioration of physical health. Gastrointestinal 
illnesses, commonly caused by lack of nutrition, often also had psychosomatic origins and 
affected both men and women.73 Limmer, who recorded a surprisingly balanced diet in his diary, 
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writes almost weekly about his “catarrh” (gastro-enteritis, a chronic inflammation of the 
gastrointestinal tract). Female interviewees talked about their “nerves.” As one 36-year-old 
housewife explained: 
Every time the siren sounded, I went into a different shelter with the idea that the one I 
was in last time would surely be hit. It was a great fear that one had, a terrible fear, I think 
all women experienced it, the men not so they stood outside and watched; but I put cotton 
in my ears to shut myself out as completely as possible. It was too awful to talk about.74 
Symptoms such as these were called “alert psychosis.” In 1943, after the population had endured 
months of the sustained Allied air campaign in the northwest, the Central Office for Public 
Health gave advice for forming “physical and mental ‘hedgehogs’ so that the points of attack by 
terror and bombs are greatly reduced.”75 To prevent illness such as pneumonia, or to lessen the 
tendency to panic, the office recommended actively developing resources of resilience, so-called 
“positive energy”: “In this case these sources are unrelenting toughness, fanaticism and a 
glowing hatred, which the soldier too only develops at such moments.” 76 Clearly, the women 
were asked to take on soldierly qualities, further calling into question the separation of front and 
home front. While girls and young women who came of age in the militaristic environment of 
the Bund Deutscher Mädel (League of German Girls, BDM), firmly indoctrinated by Nazi 
ideology, showed some indicators of the required toughness, middle-aged and old women had 
difficulties conjuring up the right spirit to join such an affective community of hatred.77  
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The Brandnacht 
The night of September 11/12, 1944 ended all illusions regarding the low probability of 
Darmstadt being targeted. With increasing Allied success in the skies over Germany and 
decreasing numbers of available targets, the town’s luck ran out. In his USSBS interview a 33-
year-old engineering assistant at the Technical University remembered: 
The attack came at 11:30. (…) We heard that there was a squadron over the Saar region 
headed east, then that there was one west of Frankfort headed east. Then that the one in 
the south had turned north at Heidelberg, and that the northern one had turned south at 
Frankfort. That could mean only one thing. Those planes had Darmstadt written on 
them.78 
 
There was little time for rushing to safety between the warnings and the actual attack. No. 627 
RAF mosquito squadron released the first target identification markers at 11.51 pm, three 
minutes after flares had illuminated the night sky over Darmstadt. At 11.54 pm, they dropped the 
first incendiaries, which would be followed by 979 tons of explosives (so-called block busters, 
which sever roofs and walls of houses yielding them more vulnerable to fire bombs), air mines, 
phosphorus bombs, and more incendiaries over the course of the next fifty-one minutes.79  
 The effectiveness of this new carpet-bombing strategy was evident in the city’s 
residential areas. In a matter of minutes, flames soared high, producing smoke and high 
temperatures that even melted glass. The fires turned cellars into death traps, as the young 
engineering assistant explained: “The cellar started to get smoky. My neighbor and I helped old 
women that were there get out. We had to lead them by the hand. We got them into the bunker 
which we had built ourselves in the neighborhood.” 80  In the absence of public bunkers in 
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Darmstadt, the engineering assistant’s neighborhood had built their own in a common effort of 
self-protection. Since the beginning of the British strategic bombing campaign, then, Selbstschutz 
in Darmstadt had become more than the abstract concept that Gregor describes in the case of 
Nuremberg where “The vast bulk of the population fell into the category of Selbstschutz, which, 
essentially, meant that they were to take to their cellars and hope for the best.”81 On the contrary, 
if resources were available, self-protection precautions not only increased chances of survival, 
they could also help to sustain people psychologically. Selbstschutz offered people in less 
protected towns such as Darmstadt a notion of control because they felt they had done everything 
in their power to increase their safety. It also contributed to the development of communal bonds 
and mutual responsibility as illustrated by the men securing the evacuation of older women from 
the basement. When remaining in the cellar became life threatening, this housing community 
together decided to make the risky switch to the safer bunker. 
Whereas young women had no prior experience in warfare, older women could at least 
relate the World War II home front experience to their memories of World War I. “I simply felt 
that the war should not have come. We older people have suffered enough in the first war. I was 
very frightened when the war broke out,” a 61-year-old widow told her interviewer.82 But even 
the ability to make comparisons to World War I did not necessarily mean that the older female 
generation fared better in the war. Knowledge about arms and bombs became crucial for the 
ability to act rationally and survive. Besides small incendiary bombs, which caused only limited 
fires and were relatively easy to extinguish with water, the British bombing squadrons 
increasingly dropped larger canister bombs containing phosphorous solutions that caught fire 
upon contact with air. The force of impact spread the incendiary substance causing everything 
that came in contact with it to burn immediately. Sand was the only efficient remedy as it soaked 
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up the phosphorous.83 Officials had tried to keep news about this novel British bomb low profile. 
The hesitance to share vital information with the public reveals a considerable dilemma for the 
state between practicable means for survival and a continued propaganda effort. By letting only 
the exclusively male aerial defense auxiliaries of the early air war years in on the information 
and prohibiting the publication of this fire prevention awareness, women were initially excluded 
from crucial knowledge.84 Furthermore, the newspapers and even pamphlets like Sirene, which 
were published to educate the public about air raid provisions, kept their advice very simple.85 
Consequently, the ignorance of certain bombs’ particular features made the female population 
physically and mentally more vulnerable during aerial attacks. Recalling her experiences during 
one of the early raids on Darmstadt in 1943, a 34-year old housewife apologetically mentions her 
lack of knowledge about appropriate conduct near dropped air-mines: 
When we had alarm I thought it was not actually a raid, but the bombs were dropping 
soon afterwards. I took my child, left everything, and ran to the cellar. About two houses 
away from us an air-mine dropped. The concussion was so great, my child and I were 
thrown on the floor. I did not know then that we had to lie down.86  
With new war techniques and the different political environment of the Third Reich many elderly 
people, especially less educated women, had difficulty adapting. Yet, they seemed neither afraid 
nor embarrassed to disclose their lack of political knowledge.87 “I felt after the second big raid 
that I did not want to continue with the war, but I was cought [sic] between the bombings and the 
Government. I knew that I could not say anything. My grandson told me so.”88 The 73-year-old 
housewife relied on the assistance of younger male relatives to maneuver through the pitfalls of 
Nazi society. This woman constructed her selfhood as a victim of politics, paralyzed by tensions 
between her desire for peace and government demands on her resilience. But younger women 
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also declared ignorance of political matters or refused to answer political questions, which raised 
interviewers’ suspicion.89 Given that vital information about aerial attacks was hardly accessible 
for women until well into the strategic bombing phase, the female population was to some degree 
dependent on the shared knowledge of their husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons. Their 
ignorance possibly led to a higher degree of fear and superstitious behavior among women, such 
as switching shelters with each raid. Whereas female bunker-mates were often described by men 
as acting emotionally or, in their contemporary parlance, “hysterically” in the shelters,90 men 
often tried to convey the impression of having been in control of the situation, as the earlier 
account of the young engineering assistant illustrates.  
The account of the young engineer, whose housing community left the bunker when it 
became too hot from the fires all around, also shows that the population benefitted from their 
self-protection efforts in September 1944. Meanwhile, many Hausgemeinschaften decided to 
remain in their cellars even after the “all clear” had sounded. In a cruel twist of fate, an 
ammunition convoy that was stuck in Darmstadt due to lack of gasoline caught fire. Its wagons 
exploded one after the other for some time after the planes had turned away, creating the 
impression that bombs were still falling. Thus, many tenants waited too long to exit their shelters, 
and fires remained unchecked. The USSBS area study stated with hindsight: “This delay proved 
fatal to many. By the time the explosions from the convoy ceased, many cellars had been buried 
under heaps of rubble and people were trapped in their shelters and were suffocated by the 
smoke.”91 Generally, the flames leaped quickly from house to house, especially in the center of 
the medieval settlement where they generated a firestorm of apocalyptic dimensions. The fire 
blaze also reached Darmstadt’s outskirts where “the draft was such that the flames roared 
through the streets almost horizontally just above the ground.”92 
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The young engineer and his wife escaped from the firestorm unharmed. “We stayed out 
in that open place for several hours. I was exhausted and didn’t care about anything anymore. All 
I was interested in was the bare necessities of life for my wife and me.”93 A 23-year old mother 
told a similar story: “I went into [sic] basement – baby on my arms and dragging old, blind 
mother behind – after 7 minutes my home was on fire, the heat became so great that we had to 
get out of the cellar. We crawled thru [sic] cellar window out into the street. Air pressures of 
mines tossed me around from one side of street to the other. I went to a friend’s house and after 
we were in that cellar we had to get out of there too, it caught on fire too. Then we ran 4 km to a 
farm house. I lost everything.”94 The fire brigade, which was only 160 men strong and had a total 
of thirteen engines, was overwhelmed with the extent of the fires and their attempts at 
extinguishing the flames seemed pointless against the backdrop of a burning city.95  
Hence, all that the people of Darmstadt could do was to wait for the fires to stop raging, 
then hurry to save their surviving possessions from looters. However, this undertaking proved to 
be psychologically extremely difficult, as the assistant explained in his account of September 12: 
It was only then, when the urge of life [sic] had returned to a certain extent, that I began 
to realize what had actually happened. To see the bodies of women and children lying 
around, to see the burned and charred remains of human beings, to step on something soft 
and realize that you had stepped on a human corpse: these are experiences which you do 
not forget ever. I can’t tell more about it, even now.96 
 
Such stories appear repeatedly in the Darmstadt interviews, recounting the horrors of the night 
that became known as “die Brandnacht”. Memories of this September night were highly 
disturbing. In most interviews, respondents either broke into tears or stopped their accounts 
 25 
abruptly. Nobody was psychologically braced for the terrifying sights.97 The young man and his 
wife tried to find consolidation in a place to stay and familiar faces, always hoping that their 
loved ones had been able to keep themselves safe. Yet, in fact, most of their family and friends 
had died or disappeared without a trace. His narrative of the September 11/12 raid, the most 
complete among the numerous interviews, illustrates exceptionally well the chronology of events 
while also sharing some of the terrible impressions of that night from a male perspective, with a 
strong underlying notion of male responsibility for the survival of women and the elderly. 
 Male accounts of the air raids do not contain the range of emotions that exists in the 
female interviews. This phenomenon may be ascribed to men’s composure due to the 
interviewees’ compliance with contemporary gender roles. In the 33-year-old engineering 
assistant’s narrative, emotions relating to himself are largely absent. However, his wife’s 
situation did concern him: “At first I used to worry about my wife when I was not at home; later 
I knew that she could take care of herself and was not worried.” 98  Here the man clearly 
constructed his understanding of himself as the protector of his wife. When men talked about the 
attacks, their stories mostly centered on the people they considered the weakest in their vicinity. 
A 51-year-old civil servant also worried about his wife when he was away on nightshift: “I 
thought: If it shall hit me, it will. I was more worried about my wife than about myself. My wife 
was completely hysteric [sic]. I am an old soldier and can take it.”99 While it was, in his view, 
suitable and normal for a woman to be emotional, he was much stricter in the expectations of 
himself. However, to see the fear in women and children affected men greatly: “The shakings of 
the house, the crying of the women and children affected my nerves very badly,” a city official 
aged 56 recalled.100 
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The image of the “old soldier” and references to World War I are recurrent themes in the 
interviews with the so-called “Frontgeneration” (front generation). It shows that older men drew 
on their war experiences as soldiers in WWI to cope with the situation under the bombs on the 
home front, but also supports Domansky’s observation of changing gender roles in World War I 
society when she claims that “men’s dominance over women derived no longer from their role as 
fathers but from their role as soldiers”.101 Soldierly virtues such as honor and courage were held 
in high esteem. These men had seen death and destruction first-hand in combat. Having said this, 
it is important to take into consideration that the air war of the 1940s introduced a strategy and 
technology with which Germans, even those of the Frontgeneration, were not familiar. While the 
soldier generation of 1914 to 1918 seemed mentally better prepared for the wartime sufferings, 
even they felt powerless in the face of the ongoing attacks: “As an old soldier, it wasn’t so bad 
for me,” the 53-year old factory manager at Merck maintained. “Raids were hard on women and 
children. You wouldn’t have won the war without air supremacy. The bombing attacks worked 
on our morale – gave us a sense of powerlessness. We’d see them [the planes] going overhead 
300 to 400 at a time, nothing we could do to stop them.”102 The previous experience of active 
fatherland defense compounded their helplessness, because the Frontgeneration was now put in 
a static role in a different kind of war in which they tried, but failed, to protect women and 
children. Not being able to fulfill what they perceived as their manly duty, this situation was 
demoralizing for older men. Nevertheless, they maintained in the interviews that the raids 
“neither weakened nor strengthened” their will to carry on with the war. The Merck factory 
manager felt compelled to justify his inability to contribute to the defense of Germany: “They 
can’t say in this war the home front betrayed the fighting front. We did all we could, hung on till 
the last. We’d been through the worst here by September 1944. It couldn’t be any harder for 
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us.”103 This statement alludes to the stab-in-the-back myth wherein seems to lie one explanation 
for German resilience — an invisible bond with the fighting front, an affective community of 
shared hardships that was countersigned by Third Reich propaganda. As long as soldiers were 
fighting, the home front would not betray them. 
The younger generation of men seemed psychologically better equipped than the WWI 
veterans and generally reported fewer symptoms of alert psychosis than women.104 Some young 
men who had been injured earlier in the war returned to Darmstadt. Their interviews reflect a 
high degree of experience with stressful and life-threatening situations. These case-hardened 
soldiers had already confirmed their masculinity in combat and fared well in terms of 
establishing a reasonably normal life under the bombs. Together with the old veterans, they had a 
better understanding of Allied strategy and warfare overall. Asked if he would blame the Allied 
air forces for bombing Germany, a 47-year-old business owner drew on his combat experience 
against France: “No. I saw what we did on the western front [sic]. I heard over the radio of the 
heavy destruction we had done to England. We did the same to others, why wouldn’t they bomb 
us when they got the chance.”105  Meanwhile, men without combat experience attempted to 
establish their masculinity through their intellect. Their political knowledge and strategic 
understanding yielded the bombing raids reasonable, or at least explainable. Maintaining that he 
expected to be bombed (one of a few exceptions who made this claim), a former Wehrmacht 
soldier and university assistant (29) recalled: “Yes, I expected it and was only amazed that it 
came at such a late date. Darmstadt was a railway junction and after all [had] some industries (…) 
I was prepared and know that air raids do occur in a war.” 106  In building resilience by 
normalizing the bombing and the suffering of the civilian population, this younger generation of 
men connected their experience of wartime sacrifice to the demands of the national cause. 
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The experience of loss and destruction was ubiquitous among Darmstadters as Allied 
analysis shows. “The fleet of four-engined bombers, flying at high altitude, met no opposition 
from either anti-aircraft or enemy fighters. The mechanics of the raid, between the ‘target 
sighted’ and ‘bombs away’ were almost perfunctory, and as a consequence Darmstadt was 
virtually destroyed,” the USSBS concluded on the performance of the raid. 107  The fire 
demolished approximately 78 percent of the city’s structures.108 It “dehoused” 70,000 inhabitants 
and killed at least 8,433 people.109 To this day, nobody knows the exact death toll, but it is 
evident that the bombs did not discriminate between nationalities, party membership, age, or 
gender. Among the confirmed dead were 2,129 children, 492 forced laborers, and 368 prisoners 
of war. Whereas 2,742 deaths of women were reported by October 1945, the number of dead 
men was considerably lower with 1,766, and less than one thousand military personnel were 
killed in the attack.110 The fact that most men between 18 and 45 years of age were absent likely 
contributed to the gender imbalance of the death toll. The high number of child casualties, 
however, could have been avoided if the Darmstadters would have been willing to send their 
children to the countryside with the child evacuation program Kinderlandverschickung. But here, 
as in other smaller German cities, parents chose to keep their children close in dangerous 
situations.111  
The immediate reaction of the Darmstadters to the destruction of their hometown was 
pure shock and disbelief. After earlier raids, the inhabitants had displayed resilience, as Police 
Station No. 3 reported in 1943: “The population, especially the severely affected, accepted their 
fate and distress with patience.”112 The authorities had done their best to alleviate the physical 
and mental pain caused by bombings by reinstalling utilities repeatedly over the course of the air 
war. The presence of aid organizations had served as shock absorbers, but these functioning 
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structures had also projected a certain level of control and confirmed large parts of the 
population in their belief in the infallibility of the achievements of German material culture and 
the NSDAP. 113  
The attack of September 11/12, 1944 seems to have had different effects on the citizens 
of Darmstadt. While some were so terrified that they decided to stay in the forest at night or 
hardly left the shelters all day long for fear of additional air raids, others, like a 34-year-old 
mother of two boys, became irrationally calm: “After living through the raid of Sept. 11, I can 
say that I was used to them. The following raids hardly bothered me and [during] most attacks I 
stayed home.”114 “I was not afraid anymore. I just wished they would knock out the whole town 
so we could live in peace,” recounted an exhausted housewife of 48 years.115 Interestingly, she 
differentiated between the housing structures, which she seemed to accept to be a legitimate 
military target, and the people living in them. The affect of alleged communal desire for peace, 
in her eyes, dissociated the home front from the war goals of the political leadership. More than 
anything else, people became angry with the regime and turned war-weary: “Goebbels always 
said: ‘We must stand fast with strong hearts.’ (‘Wir müssen durchhalten und starke Herzen 
haben.’) He could afford to talk that way, he was sitting quite safely in his bunker and did not 
have to suffer and worry for his life,” an older woman grumbled.116  
Darmstadters blamed the city’s defenselessness on Hitler’s erroneous war strategy.117 
They felt self-pity and humiliation in the face of the material deprivations, which contradicted 
their belief in Germany’s leading role as a force of progress in the world. “We were living in a 
very primitive manner. We had no water for 2 months, no electricity for 6 weeks. I had to build a 
stove outside so I was able to cook,” a housewife and Frauenwerk member of 42 years of age 
complained to the USSBS interviewer. And she continued: “We had to live in a few rooms, we 
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could not dress decently anymore.”118 Overall, it seems that the feeling of deprivation disturbed 
people most and, with the exception of deaths in the family, had the strongest effect on German 
resilience, caused disagreements, and loosened the affective bond of morale. Surrounded by 
destruction and death, the population believed that there was no safe place left.  
At the same time, the government took great pains to restore trust in the home front. As 
the smoke was still lingering in the streets of Darmstadt, emergency relief organizations set to 
work.119 Despite concerted efforts, with almost 80 per cent of the town’s buildings in ruins, not 
everybody could find a place to stay. Darmstadt police estimated that 49,200 persons, about 50 
percent of the population, were sent to collecting centers at the city’s outskirts and then 
evacuated to 18 nearby towns and villages after this raid. 120  However, “within a month, 
according to the food rationing office, approximately 14,500 persons returned and an additional 
2,700 came back during November and December.”121  
At first glance it might seem curious that these Darmstadters chose to live in a 
demolished town over the safety that they could have had in the countryside. Traditional tensions 
between country and town appear to be a partial explanation for this. Furthermore, the 
experience of the September raid was exceptional, and difficult to grasp for the peasant 
population of the Odenwald region. As the interviews illustrate, Darmstadters felt that someone 
who had not experienced an area attack of such extent could not possibly understand what plight 
they were suffering; this notion was affirmed when the newspapers and radio broadcast covered 
only what was absolutely necessary on the Darmstadt raids.122 By contrast, solidarity among 
Darmstadters remained strong, as a 31-year old war wife remembered: “Everybody that was able 
helped out. But it still didn’t make up for what one lost.”123 Some people even put mutual help in 
the neighborhood before their own family. “When the raid was over we came out and were 
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amazed at the sight. I went along to the corner when there was a house on fire and helped rescue 
an old man of 80 who was ill. Then I went to look for my cousin. Their house was burning too,” 
a young mother recalled.124 While the media’s silence about the extent of the raid was clearly 
motivated by propaganda considerations and war strategy, disappointed Darmstadters lost faith 
in the idea of a Volksgemeinschaft, and many of them decided rather to return to their destroyed 
hometown and the community that shared their past experiences. In these cases, morale emerged 
through deeds of solidarity; symbols were no longer sufficient. 
This was also true for official symbolic gestures to bridge the gap between individual 
suffering and the overall war effort, such as badges for the wounded (Verwundetenabzeichen) 
that the city awarded to citizens who were injured in the homeland.125 A turn to more emphatic 
language in the local newspapers when addressing fatalities on the home front attempted the 
same: “What shakes us most is the sight of so many mothers and children murdered during the 
latest raid [on Frankfurt]. They did not fall in vain! Even women, children and old people can 
fall like soldiers.”126  Likewise, the Darmstadt administration and police force changed their 
language when talking about the effects of aerial attacks within the year between the first larger 
attack on September 23, 1943 and the devastating raid almost twelve months later. After the 
September 1944 raid, the police reports suddenly spoke of air raid victims as “Gefallene,” a term 
usually used to refer to soldiers killed in action.127 In fact, Stargardt observes an earlier softening 
of official language in the winter of 1942/43, when after the first large-scale air raids the term 
“sacrifice”, formerly reserved for fallen front-line soldiers, entered the reporting on the home-
front dead.128 Officials thus first likened and then eventually equated the wartime plight of the 
civilian population to that of soldiers in defense of the country. Women were still not allowed to 
kill for the fatherland, yet their sacrifice was acknowledged as equality in patriotic death. Both 
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the badges for injuries and the shift in language signify dissolution of the binary gendered 
construction of home front and battlefront. However, these efforts apparently yielded little effect, 
or at least Darmstadters readily forgot about them. Not one of the interviewees, of whom a 
considerable portion was wounded, even mentioned the badges in the spring of 1945. The 
attempt to convey a sense of purpose for the sufferings endured by Germans under the bombs 
failed, while it further undermined traditional gender norms. 
 
Conclusion 
The myth of the German home front as united in the Volksgemeinschaft had already 
crumbled by the time USSBS interviewers set to work in Darmstadt. Bringing lines of contention 
and agreement between state and its citizens to the fore, the September 1944 raid highlights the 
ways in which a heavy attack put the Nazi regime under pressure. Contrary to the intent to 
induce communal cohesion, many aspects of gendered Nazi policy created instead an atmosphere 
of suspicion. Women were caught between policing of their reproductive bodies and the 
changing expectations about their increasingly militarized role in the war effort. Against the 
backdrop of the stab-in-the-back myth, men struggled with their failure to meet expectations as 
defenders of the home front and protectors of women and children. It started with the war of 
nerves in bunkers and cellars under Allied bombs, where the experience of helplessness 
undermined men’s soldierly self-perception. Moreover, the realities of everyday life in the 
destroyed city worked against official pleas for perseverance. Primitive living conditions 
frustrated large parts of the Darmstadt population and made them increasingly war-weary. 
Morale and will to go on in an unwinnable war was heavily defined by how the individual 
related to the affective national and immediate local community. It is here that the self emerges 
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in relation to gendered social and institutional structures, especially in the politicized interview 
setting of the USSBS. These dynamics bring about insights that can fruitfully inform how 
historians view late-WWII home front society and the emergence of air war memory. First, high 
self-awareness among respondents played into gendered expectations of their interviewers by 
evoking archetypes, for instance the vigilant mother and caring daughter, the male protector, or 
the helpless older woman. Second, they constructed their gendered subjectivity in response to 
changed social and political dynamics under Nazism and the requirements of war. Third, 
respondents felt the need to justify their actions vis-à-vis the occupation authority, albeit not 
apologetically, but rather in keeping with the calls for duty to the fatherland that had decisively 
shaped German wartime society. Working in defense of the country, young women not only 
reintegrated into the community that had put them under scrutiny through Nazi reproductive 
policy, but they also developed into a significant and officially acknowledged pillar of the public 
sphere as the end of the Third Reich was nearing. Their wartime experience stimulated a change 
in gender relations that preceded “the hour of the women” of the occupation period, famously 
embodied by the Trümmerfrauen.  
Instrumental for survival during the chaotic hours of the air raids was, however, the 
solidarity of the neighborhood, even if it was temporally and spatially bound. Men and women 
connected with people in their vicinity who shared the same fate, and supported each other in the 
struggle to survive and resettle after the smoke had cleared away. These spontaneous but real 
affective communities enabled them to live on despite individual feelings of powerlessness and 
indifference. Paradoxically, the Allied machinery of destruction created the bond that Nazi 
ideology had striven in vain to achieve. 
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